Europe's flagship joint armament programmes are unravelling one after another, to the benefit of US suppliers. The SCAF (future combat air system), led by France, Germany and Spain through Dassault, Airbus and Indra, is nearing its end: the 18 April deadline for reconciliation between Éric Trappier (Dassault) and his German Airbus counterpart has been pushed out, and both Berlin and Madrid are tilting towards the American F-35. Same story for the MGCS (the Franco-German future main battle tank), where the industrial split and the schedule have stalled: France has already drawn up an internal plan to replace its Leclerc tank alone by 2037 if needed. The Eurodrone (Airbus, Dassault, Leonardo) is running eight years late; only about fifteen units have been ordered to date, against hundreds of US MQ-9 Reapers already in service.
The figures confirm the shift. According to the European Defence Agency (EDA), more than 60 per cent of armament purchases by the 27 member states between February 2022 and June 2023 were made outside the EU, and 63 per cent from US manufacturers. Total orders over that period top €100bn, against €52bn in all of 2021. On the order books, the US F-35 dominates — Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Finland, Denmark, Norway and the Czech Republic are customers — while the French Rafale sells mostly outside Europe (India, UAE, Greece, Croatia, Indonesia, Egypt, Serbia). Raytheon's Patriot and Lockheed Martin's THAAD have captured most European air-defence demand, pushing the Franco-Italian SAMP/T aside.
Several causes explain this swing. US delivery times — 18 to 36 months for an F-35 vs 5 to 7 years for a Rafale in wartime — remain decisive. NATO interoperability, the maturity of already-serial-produced systems, and faster integration into allied command chains also matter. European joint programmes, by contrast, suffer from fragmented governance: each state demands its industrial share, which stretches schedules and lifts costs. France has been pushing since 2017 for a European defence industrial and technology base (EDITB); the facts show that battle is, for now, largely lost. Source: Les Echos, 20 April 2026, Anne Drif.
The story in one line. Europe’s flagship joint armament programmes — SCAF, MGCS, Eurodrone — are collapsing one after another, while more than 60 per cent of EU-27 armament orders between February 2022 and June 2023 went abroad, 63 per cent of them to US manufacturers.
Key numbers
- Share of EU-27 defence purchases made outside the EU (Feb 2022–Jun 2023): >60%.
- Share with US manufacturers: 63%.
- Cumulative EU-27 orders over the period: >€100bn, vs €52bn for all of 2021.
- SCAF: 18 April deadline pushed out; Germany and Spain leaning towards the F-35.
- MGCS (Franco-German future main battle tank): France internally considering a solo Leclerc replacement by 2037.
- Eurodrone: ~8 years late, only ~15 units ordered vs hundreds of US MQ-9 Reapers already in service.
- F-35 vs Rafale delivery lead time: 18–36 months vs 5–7 years in wartime.
Why it matters
This is not an industrial footnote, it is a sovereignty choice. Under pressure from the war in Ukraine and then the Iran-Israel conflict, European states rearmed in a hurry and bought American because it was faster, more mature and more NATO-interoperable. The problem: every F-35 ordered undermines the industrial case for SCAF, every Patriot undercuts the SAMP/T, and every Reaper sold hurts the Eurodrone. The European defence industrial and technology base (EDITB) that Paris has championed since 2017 is losing its natural customer base before it ever reached maturity.
The governance gap is the other big lesson. The US has a single prime contractor, a running serial production line and a stable doctrine of use. European programmes arbitrate between three or four countries, each demanding its industrial share; schedules stretch, costs blow up, and end customers — including European ones — walk away. For sector investors, that tilts the premium to US primes (Lockheed, Raytheon, Northrop) and penalises European primes until a credible industrial split emerges.
Takeaway
European rearmament is real — but the dollar is the main beneficiary. Watch for: the post-SCAF structure (Dassault alone or Franco-other?), Germany’s final call on MGCS, and the Commission’s ability to tie European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP) funds to intra-European procurement. Without a binding mechanism, the 60/63 trend continues.
Source: Les Echos, 20 April 2026, Anne Drif.