The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is in a bitter internal fight over conscription, and the anti-Nato, pro-Moscow wing is winning. Rüdiger Lucassen — a 74-year-old former Bundeswehr colonel and ex-helicopter pilot, and one of the most pro-American figures in the party — stepped down as AfD defence spokesperson after eight years, days before colleagues were due to vote on removing him. He was replaced by Jan Nolte, a western Hesse MP who, as recently as 2024, gave interviews to Izvestia, the Russian paper co-founded by one of Vladimir Putin's closest friends.
Conscription was suspended in Germany in 2011. On paper, the AfD favours reintroducing it; in practice, at a recent party retreat, the leadership decided to dodge the topic entirely. The flag-bearer of the AfD's ethnonationalist wing, Björn Höcke, led the backlash — telling the Thuringia parliament to imagine their sons and grandsons blown up on a foreign battlefield, and refusing to support conscription in a country that, in his words, had nothing worth defending but "drag queen performances in kindergartens", deindustrialisation, mass immigration and wartime guilt. The eastern faction, where sympathy for Russia and suspicion of the US run highest, has the electoral muscle — the AfD polls up to 40% in parts of the east, is tracking first in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and could take Saxony-Anhalt in September.
Founded in 2013 during the eurozone crisis, the AfD has radicalised rather than moderated as it has grown — landing a record second place (21%) in last year's federal elections. Some western MPs still back Chancellor Friedrich Merz's rearmament and defence minister Boris Pistorius, but the line from several eastern members of the Bundestag is that military sovereignty should not be "top priority" while spending needs to be cut, and that Russia is not really an opponent. Source: Financial Times, 18 April 2026, Laura Pitel (with additional reporting by Max Seddon).
The story in one line. The AfD’s pro-American, pro-rearmament wing has lost ground to its pro-Moscow eastern faction, as long-serving defence spokesperson Rüdiger Lucassen resigns and is replaced by Jan Nolte — setting the party’s direction on the Bundeswehr ahead of two high-stakes eastern elections in September.
Key numbers
Lucassen’s tenure as AfD defence spokesperson: 8 years; age 74.
Successor: Jan Nolte, Hesse MP and former Bundeswehr soldier, interviewed by Russian paper Izvestia as recently as 2024.
German population:84 million; eastern states account for just under a quarter.
AfD vote share in parts of the east: up to 40%.
2025 federal result:21%, a record second place for the AfD.
Conscription suspended:2011 (currently being discussed again under the Merz coalition’s rearmament drive).
September 2026 state elections to watch:Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (AfD tracking first) and Saxony-Anhalt (possible first AfD-led regional government).
Why it matters
The fight is about where the AfD stands on Germany’s rearmament — the single largest fiscal and strategic shift in Berlin since the end of the Cold War. If the eastern, anti-Nato wing sets policy, the party becomes a parliamentary brake on defence spending and on Merz’s support for Ukraine, at exactly the moment when Bundeswehr reconstitution is supposed to accelerate. Höcke’s public argument against conscription — that Germany has nothing worth defending — is ideological, but the political logic is electoral: eastern voters are sceptical of the US and sympathetic to Moscow, and that is where the AfD’s marginal seat gains sit.
Lucassen’s exit confirms the internal power has shifted. Nolte’s replacement profile (former Bundeswehr but interviews in pro-Kremlin outlets) is a carefully split signal: operational credibility on defence, ideological alignment with the east. Some western MPs, like Gerold Otten, still back Pistorius’s rearmament because “defending the country” is a constitutional requirement — but they are no longer setting the tone.
Takeaway
Ahead of the September regional votes, expect the AfD to avoid a clear line on conscription and to frame rearmament as fiscally wasteful rather than strategically wrong. For European defence watchers, the relevant signal is not the AfD’s official position but its capacity to pull the Bundestag centre of gravity on Ukraine, arms budgets, and Nato spending targets over the next 12 months.
Source: Financial Times, 18 April 2026, Laura Pitel (with additional reporting by Max Seddon).