Big losses and grumbling fans: Chelsea's private equity revolution under Clearlake and Boehly runs into trouble
Source · Private Equity desk
— Summary
Chelsea this month reported a £262mn pre-tax loss in 2024-25, a record for a Premier League club, under owners Clearlake Capital and financier Todd Boehly, who bought the club for £2.5bn almost three years ago. Under previous oligarch-owner Roman Abramovich, the club lost about £1mn a week for almost two decades — a pace the current owners have now outdone. Since the takeover, Chelsea have spent about €1.7bn (£1.5bn) on players, parted ways with four head coaches, and not agreed on whether to modernise Stamford Bridge or move elsewhere.
The financing is private-equity style. At its core sits a $500mn payment-in-kind note from Ares Management to Chelsea's holding company 22 Holdco, carrying interest at 11.2 per cent that rolls into the principal (which stood at £595.9mn last June and falls due in 2033); a separate entity is on the hook for another £794mn of loans. The owners committed £1.75bn at the outset and still have £1.3bn on hand. Revenues rose 4.8 per cent to £490.9mn in 2024-25 and are expected to reach about £700mn this year, boosted by winning the inaugural Fifa Club World Cup. Chelsea is now profitable on an operating basis. Player trading has offset some spend: €1.75bn of signings vs. €921mn of sales. Contracts often run seven years or more, letting the club amortise player fees over longer periods to stay inside financial regulations.
Stamford Bridge is the strategic stumbling block. Its 40,000-capacity generated £86.7mn of match-day revenue last year vs. £160mn at Manchester United's 74,000-seat Old Trafford. An Earl's Court move has dimmed after two councils approved plans without a stadium. Just over half of 4,000 Chelsea Supporters' Trust survey respondents said they were "very unconfident" the club is being run for sustained success. Champions League qualification — worth €75mn-€80mn this season — hangs on the last six games, with Chelsea sitting sixth. Source: Financial Times, 18 April 2026, Samuel Agini.
The story in one line. Three years into the Clearlake-Boehly era, Chelsea has posted a record Premier League pre-tax loss, overspent on players, stalled on a new stadium and sits outside the Champions League places — a private-equity ownership model that has not yet converted capital into on-pitch results.
Key numbers
2024-25 pre-tax loss:£262mn — a Premier League record.
Takeover price (2022):£2.5bn; owners’ total commitment £1.75bn, with £1.3bn still on hand.
Player spend since takeover:€1.75bn of signings, €921mn of sales.
Ares PIK note:$500mn original, principal £595.9mn at June 2025, interest rate 11.2%, matures 2033.
Additional loans at a separate entity: £794mn.
2024-25 revenue:£490.9mn (+4.8%); current-year guidance around £700mn, boosted by Fifa Club World Cup.
Match-day revenue:£86.7mn from Stamford Bridge (40,000 seats), vs. £160mn at Manchester United’s Old Trafford (74,000 seats).
Champions League prize money this season:€75mn-€80mn.
Chelsea Supporters’ Trust survey: just over 50% of 4,000 respondents said they are “very unconfident” the club is run for sustained success.
Why it matters
The financing is revealing. A payment-in-kind (PIK) note is a loan whose interest is added to the principal instead of paid in cash — the owners deferred cash interest but compounded what they owe into £595.9mn due 2033 at 11.2%. Stretching player contracts beyond the standard five years allows amortisation (spreading the transfer fee as an annual expense over the contract length) of signings over a longer period to stay inside UEFA and Premier League financial rules. Treating players as “stocks in a portfolio” (the FT’s phrase) has delivered Cole Palmer but also the Mudryk case — Mykhailo Mudryk was signed for a reported £62mn upfront on an 8.5-year deal in 2023 and has been suspended since December 2024 after testing positive for a banned substance (he denies wrongdoing).
Stamford Bridge is the real moat missing. The £86.7mn vs. £160mn Old Trafford gap sizes the match-day revenue hole that a larger or redeveloped stadium would close; without it, the PIK note matures before the asset base has expanded. Champions League participation — €75mn-€80mn per season — provides the swing variable on revenue.
Takeaway
A classic private-equity underwrite — pay for scale, leverage the balance sheet, drive revenue — is colliding with football’s specific economics: sporting performance is volatile, player trading is cyclical, and fan patience finite. With Chelsea sixth with six games to go, and a stadium decision still unresolved, the Clearlake-Boehly thesis enters the next 12 months with the burden of proof on the owners, not the critics.
Source: Financial Times, 18 April 2026, Samuel Agini.